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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS
IN THE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM
REGINALD PARKER*

"A good government," Albert Einstein said recently, "not only gives
its citizens a maximum amount of liberty and political rights but also
provides for a certain amount of economic security."' Our Constitution provides for political rights and liberties but not for economic
security. Unlike foreign federal constitutions it neither provides for
it directly nor delegates social legislation to the states; nor does the
Constitution expressly prohibit this type of law. As, however, the
Constitution authorizes the states to exercise powers not reserved to
the central government, 2 it may be deduced that unemployment relief
legislation is within the competence of the states, at least if it stays
within the confines of other provisions limiting state power, such as the
Contract Clause of Article I, Section 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Inasmuch as these limitations, however, do not appear to be
relevant for our discussion it can be stated plainly that the states have
legislative jurisdiction pertinent to unemployment compensation.
Yet many of the states either cannot or do not want to act on matters
of social welfare. The reasons for this inertia have been exposed
convincingly by Senator Neuberger 4 and need not be explored here.
Suffice it to say that what is true now was true in the 1930's: some of
the states had workable unemployment relief laws but many others approached the problem feebly and reluctantly. It was, as is so often
5
the case, the Federal Government to whom everybody looked.
The Congress might have tried to enact a federal unemployment
compensation law. No doubt, a federal workmen's compensation
statute could be enacted today, 6 and one might be inclined to hold
* Professor of Law, Willamette University.
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1954, §1, p. 34, col. 1.

2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.

3. The procedural impact, if any, of the Fourteenth Amendment is discussed
infra. pp. 444-45.
4. Neuberger, The Decay of State Governments, 207 HARPER'S MAGAZI1E 34
(Oct. 1953).

5. For a good survey of the history of American unemployment compensation
see Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21
(1945); RiESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 461-65 (1950).
See also Larson and Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in
the United States, supra p. 181.
6. See the discussions in Miller, The Quest for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Law for RailroadEmployees, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 188 (1953);
Parker, FELA or Uniform Compensation for Alt Workers?, 18 id. at 208.
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likewise in favor of a federal unemployment law. Yet, despite a
present-day tendency of the Supreme Court to leave it to Congress
to determine for itself what is within the federal orbit,7 doubts cannot be completely dispelled. Can the regulation of payments for unemployed be classified as a regulation of "commerce" by any stretch
of the imagination? Wages, hours, prohibition or limitation of child
labor or home work, collective bargaining, the insistence on peaceful
labor relations, the regulation even of industrial safety and accidentsall these things do affect production and sale and hence the commerce
of the nation. Measures to prevent unemployment would be "commerce" to be sure. But to put on organized relief, under whatever
name, those already unemployed has a rather remote relation to any
customary meaning of this word and the tenuousness of the connection between unemployment relief and commerce would not be
appreciably eliminated by the fact that unemployment agencies also
endeavor to find new jobs for the people on the rolls.
Furthermore, aside from these constitutional considerations, there
could be raised the policy argument that such a law, restricted to
relations "affecting," at least, interstate or foreign commerce, would
not give the necessary relief to those whose work or unemployment
does not so affect commerce. While the scope of the Commerce Clause,
and hence of the agency applying it, has at times been construed very
broadly, 8 at other and more recent times the law-enforcing agency
has been held to have authority to restrict its own "jurisdiction" to
very narrow confines. 9 This authority, if similarly conceded to a
federal unemployment compensation board, would make the uniform
federal law something less than desirable. Whole segments of the
population could be reduced to poverty if our hypothetical administrator should find it inexpedient in "effectuating the policy of the
act" to pay compensation to certain groups of unemployed workers.
No further discussion of these arguments in favor of or against both
the constitutionality and desirability of a federal law need be made,
because no such general law exists or has been seriously proposed
at this time. Instead of enacting and administering a federal law or
of leaving the matter completely to the states, our constitutional wis7. For a dramatic narration of this development see Stern, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 946 (1946).

8. E.g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942)- (janitor of building

whose tenants were engaged in interstate commerce held subject to federal
Wage and Hour Law); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51 (4th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 795 (1944) (local streetcar line employees).
9. NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
684 (1951); Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951);
NLRB Press Releases of July 1 and 14, 1954, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 1008, 2042 (1954);
PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 263 (1952).
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dom has found a solution that accomplishes the desirable uniformity of
a federal law and avoids limitations that might arise from the Commerce Clause: the technique of a grant-in-aid statute.
Briefly, our federal law provides that every employer, as defined and
delineated in the law, must pay a federal unemployment tax, which
is administered and collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Each state then gets a share of this revenue if the state complies with
certain minimum conditions, which fact must be certified by the
Secretary of Labor.10 The proper use by the states of the money collected by the Federal Government is assured by a procedure under
which the Secretary of Labor, after notice and opportunity for hearing to the respective state agency, is authorized to stop further payment to the state.11
This form of federal lawmaking has been upheld as constitutional.
In a decision destined to become a landmark in American constitutional
history, Justice Cardozo for the majority of the Court ruled that the
Social Security Act of 1935, including its provisions pertaining to the
administration of the unemployment tax, was valid. The conditional
grant-in-aid is a valid exercise of the federal "power to lay and collect taxes" and it violates neither the Fifth nor the Tenth Amendment.1
Federally assured unemployment compensation is here to stay. This,
however, does not mean that we have a federal unemployment com13
pensation law. Unlike, say, the Federal Fmployers' Liability Act,
which is a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause and
providing for federal law in regard to injuries of railroad workers, the
Social Security Act and the Internal Revenue Code did not create
a federal, substantive, unemployment relief law. The FELA may be
enforced in a state court; 14 but in adjudging rights and duties under
that law, the courts apply federal law, and the Supreme Court has

seen to it that there has been uniformity of interpretation of at least
the more important questions of the law.15 Not so in our field of dis10. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 §§ 3301-3308 (the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act); Social Security Act, c. 3, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-503 (1952). The wisdom of
dividing the federal administrative authorities created by these two statutes
among the Treasury, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare Departments
can be doubted.
11. INT REV. COnE OF 1954 §§ 3303-3305; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 502, 503 (1952).
12. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
13. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 36 STAT. 291 (1910)', 53 STAT. 1404 (1939),
45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (1954).
14. Notwithstanding the fact that its provisions may be enforced in the
federal district courts. 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (1954).
15. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 37 CORNEmLL
L.Q. 799 (1952); Ennis, An Analysis of Judicial Interpretation and Application
of CertainAspects of the FederalEmployers' Liability Act, 18 LAw & CONTEMP.
PoB. 350 (1953); Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 12
F.R.D. 13 (1952).
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cussion. The federal statute does not delegate enforcement of unemployment relief to state authorities, judicial or administrative, which
then would be confronted with the task of applying federal and not
state law, wherefore uniformity could be insisted upon as matter of
(federal) law. Rather, the unemployment laws that are on the federal
statute books are mere Rahmengesetze, as the Germans call it"frame laws" which the states may fill in, not with mere administrative
detail intended to concretize already existing law, but indeed both
to make and concretize the general norms necessary to carry out an
unemployment relief program. In short, the states are the makers of
the necessary statutes as well as the enforcers of the statutes. No
"federal question" in our accustomed sense authorizing individuals to
seek redress in court under federal law arises. If a state chooses to
enact no law providing for unemployment compensation, then there
is no unemployment compensation in that state and the national
government has no legal means to do anything about it. This situation, needless to say, is not very likely to occur because in such a
case the employers would nevertheless be forced to pay the federal
unemployment tax.16 Political pressure would certainly see to the
enactment of the necessary statute. The federal law leaves to the
states the political choice to have or not to have federal unemployment
relief, and the choice has been made in the affirmative in every
American jurisdiction.
If a state does comply with the federal act, it is the statutory duty
of the Secretary of Labor to so certify and, upon his certification, of
the Secretary of the Treasury to make the necessary funds available
to the state. 17 These federal agencies are vested with no political discretion that would authorize them to withhold funds despite state
compliance. In the unlikely case that a state does not wish to avail
itself of the federal funds, no funds will be alloted to it and no further
federal administrative measures need to be taken.
If, however, the state merely purports to, but does not actually
comply with every one of the conditions laid down in the law,18 the
Secretary of Labor must notify the state that payments from the
federal offices will no longer be forthcoming until the state changes
its ways. Such a decision of the Secretary of Labor must be preceded
OF 1954 §§ 3301, 3306 levies the unemployment tax on

16. INT. REV. CODE
"every
employer" who (after December 31, 1954) employs more than three

persons, without regard to whether his state has an unemployment compensation law. This was upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 3304; Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 503
(1952).

18. Such as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 3303-3305; Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 502, 503 (1952).
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by "reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing the State
agency .... ."19 No further procedural safeguard is set forth in the
act. Particularly, the making of the Labor Secretary's administrative
decision is probably not subject to the procedure of the Administrative
Procedure Act, because the adjudicatory procedure of that act is restricted to cases "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing." 20 The statute (the Social
Security Act) on the other hand, requires opportunity for hearing, but
it does not require that the decision be made upon the record, i.e,
the record of the hearing.21 As a matter of fact, no record need be kept
at all, so far as the Social Security Act goes.2 2 The procedure that the
Department of Labor' actually follows is apparently quite informal
23
and in any event not set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations.
It may be added that the Social Security Act neither provides for
nor excludes judicial review of the Secretary's decision adverse to
the state involved. From the silence of the law it could be deduced
that judicial review is available, an argument that could be fortified
24
by a reference to Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Despite the fact that the APA's hearing provisions might not be applicable here, as has been indicated above, the APA as such is, at
least by its general language. Section 2 includes in its purview any
"agency" not specifically excluded and I can see no part of or
amendment to the APA that would specifically exclude the Secretary
of Labor or state-federal relation procedures. Thus one could interpret
the law so as to reach without particular strain the result that a state
agency against which the Secretary of Labor has reached an adverse
decision may seek judicial review. But, as Professor Davis aptly
demonstrated, statutes do not necessarily mean what they say.2
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 503 (b) (1952).
20. Administrative Procedure Act §5, first sentence.
21. For a discussion of this type of hearing in general see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 41-43 (1947); DAVIS,
ADmiNISTRATIVE LAW 413, 425-29 (1951)'; PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 207-92,
215-16, 221, 231 (1952).
22. The absence of judicial review provisions, see infra at notes 24-28,
strengthens the argument that the federal decision is not one to be made upon
the record. See the literature cited supra note 21.
23. A letter of the Department of Labor assured me of the informality of
this procedure if any should ever be entertained. The failure to have and
publish procedural rules on this matter contrary to APA § 3 and the Federal
Register Act, 49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1954 Supp.), has remained
unexplained. For a good analysis of the present method of publishing regulations, see Newman, Government and Ignorance, 63 HAnv. L. REV. 929 (1950).
24. APA § 10 purports to recognize judicial review except if precluded by
statute or if involving a matter committed to agency discretion. But see
Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954), where it
is demonstrated convincingly that the statute cannot strictly be interpreted
to mean what it says.
25. Davis, supra note 24, at 433.
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After all, it seems to have never been doubted that the Presidentcertainly a governmental authority who is neither the Congress nor
a court 26 -is not an "agency" despite the definition of Section 2.27 And
there are several reasons why a decision denying further unemployment funds to a state might be regarded as so "final" as to preclude
court review. 28 Be all this as it may, no decision of any court ever
seems to have dealt with this problem by either allowing or rejecting
judicial review.
In any event, however, one thing is clear: in whatever mode the
federal-state relationship is worked out and however strictly or leniently the federal supervisory authority is exercised, as far as the
individual claimant is concerned the law that governs his unemployment compensation claim is state law and not federal law. So far as
he is concerned, no "federal question" arises. The FELA, to allude
once more to the above-mentioned example, makes it- mandatory that
certain of its phases be construed not merely uniformly but indeed in
accordance with federal law as laid down by the Supreme Court; and
if a state through its courts disobeys this mandate, the individual
concerned may address himself to the Federal Government, that is, to
the Supreme Court.29 Now the Social Security Act, too, must be administered in accordance with certain federally prescribed principles,
as we have seen; but if this mandate is violated by a state through
its administrative agencies or judicial review courts, the individual
has no further legal redress. He may "inform" the Department of
Labor or of Health, Education, and Welfare, but this has no more legal
effect than to write one's congressman. The Federal Government may
or may not act upon the individual's petition; 30 and if it does, the ensuing state-federal administrative procedure conducted by the Department of Labor does not give individuals standing to partake nor will
31
its outcome affect their rights as already adjudicated by the state.
Thus, aside from federal territories and districts, we have forty-eight
26. APA § 2(a) declares that the Act is applicable-at least some of its
provisions-to "each authority . . .of the Government . . .other than Congress, the courts or the governments of the possessions" etc.
27. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 71 (1952).

28. Arguments against judicial review could center around the Federal
Government's sovereign position: in making grants and giving aid it need not
subject itself to the control of the judiciary. Compare the situation under the
Renegotiation Acts, 50

U.S.C.A. Appendix §§ 1191 (e) (11), 1193 (e), 1218(b)

(1951) where, however, court review is verbatim excluded.
29. See note 15, supra.
30. One of the statutorily ordained reasons for intervention by the Secretary
of Labor is "a denial, in substantial number of cases, of unemployment compensation to individuals entitled thereto under such [i.e. the state's] law."
42 U.S.C.A. § 503 (b) (1) (1952).

31. The absence of published procedural regulation, see note 23 supra, adds
weight to the proposition that individuals have no procedural standing in the
Labor Department's hearing against a state, if ever one should take place.
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state laws applied and enforced by the states and, as far as employers
and employees are concerned, only by the states. This does not mean
that the law of unemployment compensation is not fairly uniform
throughout the nation.3 2 It is, very much so, which obviously indicates
that the peculiar way of federal supervision by the grant-in-aid method
has proved efficacious. The legal situation does mean, however, that
we do not here deal with one body of federal administrative law, but
rather with forty-eight state administrative agencies of different composition and power.
The federal law requires that the agency be manned by personnel
appointed on a merit basis (but it makes it clear that the Federal
Government must not otherwise exercise authority in regard to the
selection, tenure, and compensation of the individual state officials);
that the agency's "method of administration" be "reasonably calculated" to insure full unemployment compensation when due to a
claimant; and that these payments be made solely through the state's
public (or other federally approved) agencies.3 3 A further provision
of the Social Security Act decrees that there must be an "opportunity
for a fair hearing" to claimants, 34 which we shall treat later.
Thus we have a divergent system of administration of the same
social principle, which is effectuated through the same federal tax.
Such a multifarious way of law enforcement may be wasteful, but it
is apparently inevitable in a federal system of government.
For a rough survey of these administrative organizations suffice
it to note that in all the American jurisdictions the claims for unemployment "compensation"-a psychologically understandable, wellmeant euphemism for what actually is not compensation at all, but
relief, plain and simple, albeit on an organized level somewhat above
that of the soup kitchen of Dickens's days-are to be commenced in
the public employment offices of the states or in the local federal
offices in the case of territories, possessions and the District of Columbia. A completely informal investigative procedure then takes place
with no notice or hearing to all possible parties required. A simple
determination whether the claimant is covered by the law and whether
he has a right to receive compensation, as well as the amount of his
claim, is usually made by the deputy administrator of the agency, who
will refer the matter to higher authority if a dispute or a more complex
32. Uniformity of construction has been held to be a governing
Arnold College v. Danaher, 131 Conn. 503, 41 A.2d 89 (1945). But
ployment Comp. Comm'n v. National Life Ins. Co., 219 N.C. 576,
689 (1941) (state legislature not required to conform to "national
in every respect).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 503(a) (1) and (2) (1952).
34. Id. § 503 (a) (3).

principle.
cf. Unem14 S.E.2d
ideology"
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question is involved.1 In this case, or if the claimant or anybody else
who has standing as a party to seek review 36 is dissatisfied, the case
goes to what is usually called the appeal board, which may be conceived
as the center of administrative lawmaking from a lawyer's point of
view, in that it is typically the organization to which the federal
mandate respecting a "fair hearing" is directed. It exists to assure the
aggrieved party "a fair, simple, non-legalistic hearing before an impartial, sympathetic, non-legalistic tribunal." 37 Against the decisions of
this body there lies now in most of the jurisdictions a second, final
administrative appeal to a second appeal body. Not everywhere, however, is this second appeal recognized as an unqualified right. And in
some of these jurisdictions the deputy commissioner has the same
right to a second appeal. The scope of this right to a second appeal is
not alike everywhere. In many states it exists only under certain
conditions, e.g., if decision of the (first) appeal body was not unanimous, and it is of course open to the deputy commissioner only if he
was overruled by the appeal board below.3
This second, final administrative appeal board is either an independent review body usually consisting of three members or, in some
states, the agency itself. Like the first appeal body, it may affirm,
modify, remand or set aside the decision. Its proceedings again are
39
characterized by a great degree of informality.
Against final decisions of the administrative appeal board, or of the
second appeal authority if the law provides for one, there exists
everywhere judicial review in the appropriate state court. Perchance
the federal district court may be the review tribunal if there is a
diversity of citizenship, but this will rarely occur in view of the three
thousand dollar requirement. Even if the federal court can be appealed to, however, it must apply the state law, as a vicarious state
tribunal so to speak, and no federal principle comes into play.
We shall briefly investigate the various typical administrative-legal
problems that may arise in connection with the above-sketched procedure leading to a grant or denial of unemployment compensation.
This procedure is no longer a purely investigatory one such as would
be entertained to find out whether a given "pauper" is worthy to
35. As gleaned from the statutes; Department of Labor and (former) Federal Security Agency bulletins and tables comparing the state laws and procedures; correspondence with the Department of Labor; Silverstone, The
Administration of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 205 (1945).
36. It is doubtful whether a wife or other dependent could seek party standing in her own right.
37. Silverstone, supra note 35, at 209.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. FED. SEcuRrrY
CEDURES (1947).

AGENCY,

PRINCIPLES

UNDERLYING

BENEFIT

APPEAL PRO-
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receive some food, clothes, or cash. If unemployment compensation
is to be conceived as a part of a social security system, this must mean
that discretion in the official who administers the benefits must be confined to reasonably narrow limits. The payment of "relief" is not anymore a gratuity bestowed by a benevolent government to meet an
emergency but rather an act of complying with statutory duty, pursuant to ascertainable, pre-determined legal standards. Unemployment
compensation claims procedure-though not all of its phases-can thus
be termed a "quasi-judicial" procedure. It is governed by procedural
due process of law.
The right that claims be determined by standards of due process is
embodied in the federal frame-law: "Opportunity for a fair hearing,
before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims for employment compensation are denied. '40 This requirement of a fair
opportunity to be heard may be equated with a requirement of due
process.
We may ask ourselves whether this due-process requirement is a
constitutional must-whether a state that gives a person whose claim
is denied something less than a fair opportunity to be heard thereby
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. No doubt, the answer must be
in the negative. The Federal Government is free to change the law
so as to cancel all grant-in-aid. The states are free not to accept the
aid and in so rejecting federal aid either have no unemployment relief
laws at all or laws that apply lower substantive and procedural standards than required under the Social Security Act. In short, the state
could grant unemployment compensation on such terms as it sees
fit, notwithstanding the fact that in falling below the federally prescribed standards it would lose the federal aid. The federal law, as
a condition of the grant, must be made part of the state statute; but
if that condition is broken, no right to complain arises in favor of the
claimant. The Secretary of Labor's means of enforcing the condition of
the federal aid inures to the claimants' benefit only economically-in
that the national government thereby sees to it that its policy be carried out-but not procedurally, so as to give them standing in court or
agericy.
It is true, at the present time the federal constitutional law including
the due-process mandate is on the state statute books everywhere. It
could be argued, therefore, that once the "fair opportunity" clause is a
provision in the pertinent statute, it has thereby become a right whose
violation would contravene the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
This, however, does not seem to be the law at this stage of our consti40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 503 (a) (3) (1952).
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tutional history. Unquestionably the statute must be administered so as
not to violate the Equal Protection Clause 41 and possibly other provisions of the Constitution; but as to the due process protection of
Amendment XIV, the trend is not to conceive as protecting "life,
liberty or property" those procedural rights which, merely created by
42
statute, need not exist at all.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the unemployment laws,
federally supervised as they are, have become so integrated in our
social system that their benefits can be regarded as vested rights to be
denied only upon due process of law. This line of reasoning would be
in analogy to-and not essentially weaker than many an analogy the
courts have drawn-our constitutional holding that while we are not
compelled to let any immigrants enter the United States, yet if we do,
we may deprive them of the right to reside here only in accordance
with the principle of due process of law.43 But rulings of this kind
are based on federal law. Unemployment compensation, though federally inspired, is grounded in state law.
At any rate, the law as it is at this time can be summarized as follows: (1) The "opportunity for a fair hearing" clause is in the state
laws by federal mandate; (2) the federal mandate is enforced in a way
not accessible to the individual parties to unemployment compensation
procedures; (3) yet the fair hearing requirement is in fact common to
all the state statutes; and (4) though its enforcement is left to the
states and their administrative and judicial agencies, the preferable
opinion, based on statutory construction rules applying to uniform laws
in general and greatly strengthened in particular by the common federal source of the laws, holds that these laws, including the fair hearing requirement, be interpreted uniformly.44
Thus, even without constitutional necessity, the various unemployment compensation laws do provide for what we can safely classify
as due process. In investigating this phase of our social law, we be41. AMEND. XIV, § 1, last clause.

42. E.g., United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) (no due process necessary
to investigate draftee's conscientious objector status); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (exclusion of nonresident alien without due
process of law) ; Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 745, 758 (10th Cir. 1954) ("It is
for Congress alone to say how the rights which it creates shall be enforced
It may withhold all remedy ... "); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing,
174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (statutory requirement of "due process" to precede enactment of regulation not a constitutional requirement); Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194
Pac. 595 (1920) (semble). According to the State Department practice, a
passport may be refused without due process. See Parker, The Right to Go
Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport,40 VA. L. REv. 853 (1954).
43. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, as modified, 339 U.S. 908

(1950); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
44. Arnolds College v. Danaher, 131 Conn. 503, 41 A.2d 89 (1945).
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45
come immediately aware of the scarcity of litigation on this point.
This may be ascribed to a variety of causes, the chief of which is
probably the fact that unemployed persons have no money to go
to court, and since under our system of procedure the losing party
generally need not reimburse the winner for his attorney's fee, it is
often hard for such party to find a lawyer who is willing to undertake
judicial review litigation where even if he wins he must seek his compensation from whatever the unemployed will recover. Other factors are: the great simplicity and informality of the average compensation hearing which unlike its distant relative in administrative
and welfare law, workmen's compensaton, is not "deceptively simple"
and yet "litigiously prolific";46 the smallness of the sum involved, which
may often give rise to the classical American exclamation, "forget
about it!"; the fact that fate and occasional wars and quasi-wars have
saved us from another depression, so that unemployment compensation claims, quite unlike many workmen's compensation claims, are
now usually of an ephemeral importance to the claimant; and finally,
again in view of the relative smallness of the amounts, the parties will
be reluctant to litigate a mere procedural issue such as due process.
A victim of an accident may well find it worth his while to exhaust
every procedural possibility to convince a tribunal that his accident
arose in the course of and out of his work, so as to entitle him to what
may be a lifetime annuity. Hence, there is hardly a National Reporter
without a number of workmen's compensation cases, but several
months may easily elapse between the report of two unemployment
compensation cases.
We have already gleaned from the grant-in-aid statute and the laws
enacted thereunder that the claimant must be given a "hearing"
before his claim is ultimately denied. In itself, this may not mean
that the "hearing" must be oral. According to a widely accepted belief
-a myth, unless witnesses are to be examined-there can be no due
process without such a hearing. The Supreme Court has not squarely
decided the matter in general, although the WJR decision ruled that
at least not in every situation of administrative or even judicial procedure the "hearing" must be by word of mouth.4 7 Unemployed claimants, however, usually have no money to have briefs and replies
written on their behalf. It could therefore be convincingly asserted

45. This may in turn serve as an explanation for the paucity of cases documenting this study.
46. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947).
47. Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR. The Goodwill Station, 337
U.S. 265, 274, 277 (1949). And see Albanese v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 211
(1954)' ("I would not be helped by oral repetition of the respective contentions"); NLRB v. Clausen, 188 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
868 (1951); GEtLHom AND BysE, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 1107-09 (1954).
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that whatever the law on the adequacy of written proceedings might
be otherwise, such proceedings would not be "fair" so far as unemployed claimants are concerned. Be this as it may, the laws all do
provide for oral hearings as a result of administrative appeal, that
is, before the appeal board, and where provided for, also before
the second appellate tribunal. 48
Any hearing to be "fair" must be preceded by adequate, that is
timely, notice. From the nature of the issue essenially involved it
seems to follow that no noteworthy disputes in the unemployment compensation have arisen on this point or on the related one whether and
to what extent the notice must describe with particularity the
49
subject matter of the hearing.
The tribunal before which the hearing is to be had, must be "impartial." So much and no more does the law require. There need
be no separation of functions between the organ that prosecutes the
charges (e.g., charges which if found true would terminate the receipt
of further compensation) or resists the claim on the one hand and
the one who decides on the other. The complex provisions and procedural safeguards of Sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act do not apply. Similar provisions of state administrative procedure acts, however, could be applicable if the state so
legislates. Actually, the few existing state administrative procedure
acts do not usually provide in the federal manner for independent
trial examiners and separation of functions within an agency; nor does
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, whose Section 10 merely
stipulates that, if the majority of the agency officials who are to make
the final decision have not "heard or read" the evidence, any adverse
decision shall be preceded by a proposed decision to be served on
the party with opportunity for exceptions. 50 Only Indiana makes the
separation of function of "prosecution" and adjudication mandatory.5 1
48. Four jurisdictions have only one administrative appeal. See note 35,
supra.
49. For a general discussion see DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 278 (1951)
("The most important characteristic of pleadings in the administrative process
is their unimportance"); GELLHOIIN AND BYSE. ADMIISTRATIVE LAw 722-897'
(1954): PARKER. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 45-48, 216-19 (1952). Administrative
Procedure Act § 5 (a) requires timely notice of the time, place and nature
of a quasi-judicial hearing as well as of legal authority, jurisdiction, and
matters of fact and law asserted. For the most recent administrative procedure act see §§ 10, 11 of the Massachusetts Act of June 10, 1954, Gen. Laws
c. 30 A. Its list of exemptions does not include the unemployment compensation agencies. Id. § 1 (2).
50. For surveys of state administrative procedure acts and the Model Act,
see Harris. Administrative Practice and Procedure: Comparative State Legislation. 6 OKLA. L. REv. 29 (1953)- (very good compilation); Schwartz, The
Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Analysis and Critique, 7 RuTGERS
L. REv. 431 (1953); Note, 4Am. L. BULL. 131 (1952).
51. IND. STAT. AN. § 63-3020 (Burns 1951). The payment of unemployment
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Aside from statutory refinement, "impartial" has merely the oldfashioned meaning of "unbiased" and "not interested in the outcome
of the dispute." The agency itself may very well be the hearing
tribunal.m This is no longer subject to any doubt, even though the
agency may be "interested" in the outcome in that it is the organization which administers the funds in which the petitioner claims a
share. But this interest is not a personal, pecuniary one. It is simply
the result of the fact that public officials are charged with and hence
"interested" in the proper execution of the law. In short, an agency
and its officials are no more "interested" in the enforcement of unemployment law than a criminal court in the prevention of crimes. 53
It must be observed, moreover, that the fair hearing opportunity before an impartial tribunal is preserved if it is given but once-in our
field of study usually before the appellate body. 54 It is not, and need
not be, present in the initial stage which, as we pointed out above,
simply consists in checking the petitioner's claim and rendering an
informal decision. The decision may be adverse even though it is not
preceded by a due-process hearing. This latter kind of hearing takes
place before the appellate body and unless a second appeal is possible,
as a matter of theory, at least, the constitutional due-process
requirement, where it exists, will be satisfied even if no fair
hearing at all takes place administratively, but merely a court review
de novo instead.5
The right to be represented by counsel exists apparently everywhere,
but actually only a small fraction of the cases are tried by lawyers.5 6
Due process may in a given situation require that a party be advised
as to his rights to be represented by counsel or indeed that counsel be
appointed for him, as where the party cannot speak English.5 7 Investigation discloses no case along these lines in the unemployment compensation field, and the problem lacks the importance it may have
in, say, deportation proceedings.
An irksome problem in every kind of administrative procedure is
benefits is expressly included in the adjudication provisions of the act. Id.
§ 63-3002.
52. E.g., Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156
(1944). In Connecticut the Commissioner is the (only) administrative appellate authority, and in many states the second appeal is heard by the
Commissioner or Commission. Supra, note 35.
53. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
54. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937); Hagar v. Reclamation
District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884); HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADIVUINIsTRATiVE LAW
475 (1950).
55. See the authorities, supra note 54. And see Application of Murra, 178
F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1949).
56. Silverstone, supra note 35, at 209.
57. U.S. ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1950).

1955 1

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEMS

the question as to the kind of evidence on which the agency may rely.
Unlike the basic due-process requirement, outlined above, there is no
federal requirement as to what rules of evidence, liberal or strict, the
states should direct their agencies to follow. Hence, unless there is a
state statute dealing with this problem, the state unemployment agency
will follow whai may be called the common law of administrativelegal evidence of its state; or the agency and the review court will
build up their own rules of evidence which may differ on one or
the other point from the law that pertains to other administrative
agencies of the state.
Statutes regulating the rules of evidence in regard to unemployment,
compensation but not as to other administrative adjudication are infrequent.5 8 However, there are laws, notably administrative procedure acts, dealing with administrative-legal rules of evidence and
of course such a state administrative procedure act may specifically
exempt from its provision proceedings to be entertained before the
unemployment agencies. 59 No state administrative procedure act unqualifiedly forces the agencies to follow the age-old court rules of
evidence, which were developed to protect supposedly naive jurors
60
from confusing fact with fiction.
It must, however, be regarded as the better legal policy to apply
liberal rather than strict rules of evidence. In court a rule that sounds
liberal for the plaintiff may be oppressive for the defendant. But
unemployment compensation procedures are by their very nature
non-adversary. 6' They are entertained not to determine which of two
or more parties is "right" but to find out whether a certain person
is truly "unemployed," as he claims, and if so, whether he is entitled
to relief. All evidence should, therefore, be admissible whether oral
or written, whether hearsay or direct, and be given weight in accordance with its credibility. This is now the usually accepted and
preferable rule.62 Holdings to the contrary, if persisted in by agencies
58. See Geegan v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 45 Del. 513, 76 A.2d 116

(1950) (statute permits hearings without following common law or statutory
rules of evidence).
59. See the surveys listed, supra note 50. For the rather vague federal
rule see Administrative Procedure Act § 7 (c) (exclusion of irrelevant evidence; reliable, probative, and substantial evidence required). A now pending
Oregon administrative procedure bill exempts from its provisions proceedings
before the Industrial Accident Commission. But ORE. REV. STAT. § 657.605
created the Unemployment Compensation Commission by declaring that it
is constituted by the members of the Industrial Accident Commission. It is
not clear whether the bill also means to exempt unemployment proceedings.
60. Harris, supra note 50, at 45-49. The pending Oregon bill, supra note 59,
would practically compel agencies to use court rules of evidence.
61. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156, 160 (1944);
Employment Stab. Comm'n v. Lewis, 157 P.2d 38 (Cal. App. 1945).

62. Barr v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 172 Pa. Super. 389, 93 A.2d
877 (1953); Phillips v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 152 Pa. Super. 75,
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or reviewing courts, ought to be overruled by statute. In a Washington case the agency's investigator testified that the parties (the employer and his former employee) had admitted an employment relationship. At the reopened hearing the employer testified denying
his former admission. The commission found in favor of the employment relation and therefore of the claimant. Upon the employer's
appeal, the court reversed the agency, 63 holding that the commissioner's

coficlusion was not one which "a reasonable man acting reasonably"
would have reached. 64 The court's reasoning would be fair enough if
credibility had been the issue, especially in view of the comparative
novelty of the conceptions of administrative law. Nevertheless, the
judgment whether a state commissioner-presumably a reasonable
man-acted reasonably, i.e., believed this or that piece of evidence,
should be left to the agency itself. There is no magic faculty in a
court that enables it to discern the facts, by reviewing a record or
even by hearing witnesses de novo, more accurately than a commissioner who has heard and seen the evidence.
As has been noted already, the decision of the appellate body which
follows the informal determination of the official conducting the
original, investigatory proceeding, is in most states subject to a second
appeal. (In view of the fact that the first appellate body does not
truly entertain an appeal in the technical sense, but rather conducts
the fair and impartial hearing which the claimant is entitled to, the
term "second appeal," though frequently used, is inaccurate. This
"second" appeal is an administrative, within-agency appeal, and the
"first" appeal no real appeal at all.) As far as this administrative
remedy exists it is usually entertained in the same fashion as the
so-called first or original appeal. The case is heard again and the
same rules of evidence apply. Under some laws, however, the scope
of this second hearing is limited somewhat in the fashion of a review
65
of the record.
Must an aggrieved party seek this second hearing before he may
seek judicial review? Under the well-known federal exhaustion of
remedies doctrine,6 the answer must be in the affirmative. A case
30 A.2d 718 (1943),; Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Texas Employment Comm'n. 245
S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). And see Acosta v. Landon, 125 F. Supp.
434, 439 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (hearsay evidence should have been admittpd by
deprtation authorities). But see Leggerini v. Department of Unempl. Comp.,
15 Wash.2d 618, 131 P.2d 729 (1942). In Geegan v. Unemployment Comm'n,
45 Del. 513, 76 A.2d 116 (1950) the court ruled that the agency must follow
the judicial rules of evidence, including the exclusion of hearsay, unless it
first promulgates (statutorily authorized) rules to the contrary!
63. Leggerini v. Department of Unempl. Comp. supra note 62.
64. Id. at 731.
65. PRINCIPLES UNDERYING BENETrr APPEAL PROCEDURES, supra note 39.
66. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946); Myers v. Bethle-

hem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene
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is not ripe for judicial review if there are still administrative remedies
available.67 The Administrative Procedure Act has expressed the same
thought, albeit in a somewhat involved and complex fashion: agency
action shall be final, i.e., ripe for judicial review, even though a petition for reconsideration or administrative appeal may yet be permissible, unless, however, the petition for reconsideration, etc., shall have
a suspensive effect. This is expressed by the phrase "unless . . .the
action meanwhile shall be inoperative." These words are inadequate
insofar as negative orders are concerned. An agency decision that
denies an application for, say, a license or unemployment compensation, cannot well be called "operative" or "inoperative."6 8 Yet here, too,
the states are following the federal rule-the exhaustion rule of administrative law must govern. It would be senseless to provide for a
second appeal, if the parties concerned may at their option disregard
it and apply to the courts directly.
On the other hand, if an appeal was legally possible but was "disallowed" by the appeal body, the aggrieved party need not prosecute
an obviously useless appeal but may seek judicial review from the
69
initial appellate decision, this being the "final" decision.
If the unemployment compensation case has been finally disposed of
by the agency and is thus ripe for review, the question of standing to
seek review naturally becomes of paramount importance. To solve this
problem by general principle has as yet not been possible, although
at some future date no doubt administrative law will have become
so settled as to lend itself to precise restatement or codification. Until
that time we must satisfy ourselves with such empty phrases as
"adversely affected or aggrieved party" or "person suffering legal
wrong" 70 if we feel that we must make a generally applicable statement. There is at this time no case or legal writing that has been able
to explain to any degree or precision who is aggrieved, etc., and who
71
is not.
However, the problem of standing to seek review is not as complicated in our unemployment compensation field. Unquestionably, if
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). State law has not completely adopted
the exhaustion doctrine everywhere. See, e.g., Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298,
70 A.2d 77 (1949), 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 401 (1950). See also Parker, Administrative Law in Arkansas, 4 ARK. L. REV. 107, 121, 123 (1950); Note, 35 IowA L.
REv. 79, 85 (1949).
67. Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219, 222-23 (1945).
68. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL

ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE ACT

104 (1947); DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (1951); PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 256 (1952).
69. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Chenault, 295 Ky. 562, 174 S.W.2d

767 (1943).

70. Administrative Procedure Act. § 10.
71. See the cases and controversies in
LAW 204 if., especially 221-26 (1954).
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there is to be judicial review at all, as it actually emists everywhere,
the claimant himself must have standing to seek it. The commissioner
or commission likewise must be accorded the right to seek review of
72
the action of its (impartial and hence independent) appellate body.
The only person whose standing is subject to doubt and diversified
treatment is the claimant's former employer. There is no basis for
affording him any procedural rights unless the law, as in many
states, provides for pooled funds with merit rating for employers
whereby his contribution to the state fund from which compensation
is paid depends in part on his record in having a large turn-over,
etc.7 3 Even where there is such a merit rating, however, it is doubtful
whether the employer's interest in the final outcome of a claim petition is great enough to afford him standing even during the administrative appellate procedure, much less in court. "His interest in any
particular case is practically indeterminable." 74 The preferable and
now prevailing view would not burden the court-review procedure
75
with the employer's presence as a party.
Before further exploring the field of judicial review, we may
briefly pause to consider the position of the substantive law that the
agency is to apply. This question addresses itself to the substantive
law of unemployment compensation, which is outside the scope of this
study and for which the reader may turn to other articles in this
symposium. Two topics, however, may be briefly touched upon here
because of their close connection with our consideration of administrative-legal technique: uniformity and incidental questions.
The various state unemployment compensation laws are not uniform.
Consequently, the agencies applying those laws by making individual
decisions, and the courts reviewing the decisions, cannot be expected
always to follow uniform principles. That is true even as far as the
federal minimum standards in general and the fair-hearing requirement in particular are concerned. While every state must give an
opportunity for a fair hearing, some may go further and, for instance
through a state administrative procedure act, add a variety of requirements, such as separation of functions within the agency so that
the official who prosecutes or defends is in some measure separated
72. E.g., Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Barlow, 191 Miss. 156, 1 So.2d
241 (1941). And see Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 104 N.E.2d 780 (1952)
(agency must be made party in review proceedings).

73. See Andrews and Miller, Experience Rating and Employment Stability,
7 NAT'L TAX. J. 193. (1954).
74. Pennock, Unemployment Compensation and Judicial Review, 88 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 187, 140-43 (1939); Cloe, Disputed Claims Procedure Under the
New York Unemployment Insurance Act, 39 COL. L. REV. 1151, 1177 (1939).
75. Erickson v. General Motors Corp., 276 P.2d 376, 379 (Kan. 1954). But see
Jones v. Appeal Bd. of Michigan, 332 Mich. 691, 52 N.W.2d 555 (1952); Leggerini v. Department of Unempl. Comp., 15 Wash.2d 618, 131 P.2d 729 (1942).
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from the one who decides, hearing before trial examiners, establishments of a formal record, etc. Still, when it comes to the applica76
tion of basic principles and in the absence of precise state law it is
desirable that there be uniformity of decisional law. This thought has
found judicial expression, 77 but has not yet played a dominant role
in the construction of the enabling statutes.
The agency, like any administrative agency, has but a limited jurisdiction, namely, to decide unemployment compensation claims. Yet
this jurisdiction extends of necessity to incidental questions whose
decision is relevant in reaching a decision on the main problem. The
problem of Vorfragen ("pre-questions") has so far found scant attention
in this country, yet it exists as matter of inner necessity. Labor
agencies have to decide about the mutinousness of conduct or the
contractual validity of a reinstatement offer as a pre-question to an
unfair labor practice problem.78 And any agency that handles money
benefits whose size may depend on the presence of "dependents" must
decide, incidentally to the main question granting or denying an application for benefits or increased benefits, whether the applicants' marriage is valid,7 9 whether there was a valid divorce, and so forth. 80 The
agency decision is of course not one invalidating a marriage or a
divorce or adoption. To do this the agency is not authorized and hence
has no jurisdiction. The agency merely decides pro tanto, as it were,
merely for the purpose of determining the lawfulness of a claim, that
such and such a person was or was not married or had children. The
law on this question, not at all confined to administrative agencies,
has developed in a somewhat semi-conscious fashion. Perhaps some
writer will raise it from dogmatic slumber some day."'
Turning our attention now further to judicial review, the basic
question must first be answered whether judicial review is, and
whether it must be, available. As to "is," the answer is uniformly yes.
Even where the statute was silent on this point, it was interpreted so
as not to exclude judicial review. 82 But must the law, by statute or decision provide for judicial review? The federal law makes due process
76. Or of judge-made law on this point.
77. Arnold College v. Danaher, 131 Conn. 503, 41 A.2d 89 (1945).
78. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942), NLRB v. Litchfield Mfg.
Co.. 154 F.2d 739. 742 (8th Cir. 1946)
79. LePell v. United States, 177 F.2d 1013 (10th Cir. 1949); Freeman S.S.
Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1949).
80. Drew ir. Hobby, 123 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1954): In re File No. VP395375, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2165 (Board of Immigr. App. Oct. 3, 1950) (foreign
legitimation); T.R. Miller Mill Co. v. Johns, 75 So.2d 675, 681, 682 (Ala. 1954)
(concurring opinion) (unemployment agency ought to have decided whether
applicant violated contract).

81. So far, see PARKER, ADMINIsTRATVE LAw 125, 127-29- (1952).
82. Bodinson Mg. Co. v. Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal.2d 321, 109 P.2d 935
(1941).
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mandatory and the states have adopted the standard. If a state provides for an opportunity for a fair hearing before an impartial, albeit
administrative tribunal, that is all the federal law requires. 83 The
idea that due process can exist only where there is court review84
cannot easily be founded in logic. If the agency is "impartial" then
it fulfills the most essential criterion of a court. It is true, by being
specialized an agency may fall into rigid patterns; it may become
"tough" or, conversely, "easy" on claimants. The same, however, is
quite often true of courts as well. Who could deny that the 'supreme
courts of some states are more conservative than others in questions of
workmen's compensation law, e.g., on the question of recovery for
horseplay and aggression, or that some states are "liberal" while others
are not in the field of personal injury law to such an extent that shopping for a forum known for jumbo verdicts has become a muchdiscussed problem? "Due process is not necessarily judicial process."85
Yet not all problems of legal administration can be decided with a
purely academic approach alone. While it is no doubt the correct legal
interpretation that the requirement of due process, or at any rate of a
fair hearing, does not necessitate judicial review, it might yet be
deemed the preferable choice to have court review. This is not a question of legal interpretation but rather a policy choice; and it has been
made already in that, as we pointed out, there is indeed judicial review
everywhere in our field, notwithstanding the fact that the actual cases
where redress to the courts is being sought on a problem of unemployment compensation law are relatively few.
The mode of review, as in other fields of administrative law, may
either be a procedure de novo or a review of the record. The former
is infrequent.P Its availability may cause an unwarranted and deplorable delay in getting the needed relief to the claimant, if the
commissioner is the party seeking review. It should not exist in a
field that calls for swift and simple decisions. In addition to this
policy argument the point was raised that a review de novo vests the
court with an administrative function which under the separation of
powers doctrine as embodied in the state constitutions it must not
exercise.87 , This argument, however, fails to convince. So long as nobody, . particularly not the various constitutions, declares certain matters, including unemployment claims, expressly to be "administrative"
83. Supra note 40.
'84. See, e.g., Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robinson, 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d
'156 (1944). But see Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903).
85. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 (1903).

86. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. California Unempl. Stab. Comm'n, 253 P.2d 68

(Cal. App. 1953); Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 891,
2 N.W.2d 332, 333-34 (1942).
87. Silverstone, supra note 35, at 212, 214, citing cases from Connecticut.
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our field is no more "typically administrative" than is workmen's
compensation (which in five states is administered by the judiciary) 88
or, as a matter of fact, the adjudication of any other claim.8 9 The
adjudication of unemployment compensation is no more "inherently"
administrative than the decision about a child's custody is "inherently"
judicial. However, while there should be no constitutional objection,
the institution of de novo review is, at least in the field of our discussion, not useful and it may at times be harmful.
The majority of states follow the well-known federal rule of confining judicial review to a review of the record.9 0 Under this rule,
findings of the agency will be followed if supported by substantial
evidence; and its ruling will be affirmed if it i6 grounded in law. If
the law lends itself to two or more constructions, the federal rule at
times will leave the construction to the agency under what we might
call the Hearst rule. 9' This doctrine is partly grounded in the idea that
administrative agencies are composed of experts best equipped to
decide legal problems peculiarly falling within their scope. At other
times, or concurrently with this, the federal rule is based on the
rather problematic idea of mixed questions of law and fact whose
answer, because of the preponderance of the "fact" element, must
be bindingly given by the fact-finder, i.e., the agency.9 2 At yet other
times, however, the agency's construction of the law did not find the
approval of the Court. 93 In such cases the decision was overruled as
not being grounded in a "correct" interpretation although objectively
speaking the administrative decision was not more untenable than in
the Hearst9 and related cases. Thus the above-stated federal rule must
be qualified. The review courts often but not invariably will leave it
to the agency to choose between several interpretations of the law.
88. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS BULL.
PENSATION

LAWS 42 (1950 with supplements).

No. 125,

STATE WORKVIEN'S COM-

89. Such as of veterans or for pensions.

90. E.g., Moore v. Commissioner of Empl. Sec., 273 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn.

1954); Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944);
Industrial Comm'n v. Wilbanks, 274 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1954); Wolfe v. Unemployment Comm'n, 232 Iowa 1254, 7 N.W.2d 799 (1943); Craig v. State Labor
Comm'r, 154 Kan. 690, 121 P.2d 203 (1942); Burgin v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp., 188 Okla. 645, 112 P.2d 802 (1941); Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315,
20 S.E.2d 865 (1942); Appeal of Farwest Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wash.2d 134,
114 P.2d 164 (1941). The federal rule was most lucidly expressed in Unemployment Comp. Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946), and in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), and rewritten and,
to an uncertain degree, changed in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951).
91. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402 (1941); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); O'Leary v.
Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
92. See the cases, supra note 91.
93. E.g., Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
94. Supra note 91.
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This amounts to saying that the agency construction will be followed
by the federal courts if they agree with it or, more subtly perhaps, if
they do not disagree with it. The Supreme Court is still the supreme
law interpreter in the field of administrative law, but refrains from
exercising its authority unless it strongly feels a necessity for interference.
The state courts have adopted this rule or set of principles in various
shades which could only be analyzed in a state-by-state fashion. To
undertake this would go considerably beyond the scope of this study.
In passing, however, we may note that in some states, notably New
Jersey, a mixed rule is followed. The courts are not to retry the administrative cases de novo, but will re-examine the record in a somewhat more thorough fashion than the pure substantial-evidence rule
would permit.95 Under this theory there is no room for the Hearst
doctrine. If there is a question of law, the court will decide it as
supreme authority. If there is a question that is-if the illogical picture
must be employed-a mixed question of fact and law, the New Jersey
and other courts will not necessarily give the agency the benefit of
doubt and accede to the way the latter has resolved the problem.
Thus it can happen under this theory of judicial review that a
finding of an agency though obviously made within the scope of
its peculiar competence, and even upheld by a prior supreme court,
as "entirely reasonable and appropriate" be set aside by a new
supreme court as "counter to common experience of mankind."9
It is easy in an article to draw neat lines between de novo review,
review of the record, pure substantial evidence rule, or Hearst doctrine.
For each of them there can be cited a few cases; but of none of them
could it be said that it is clearly and unequivocally being followed in
this or that jurisdiction. The Hearstrule, as we havv seen, is not a true
rule of law, but rather the semantics of the Supreme Court if it
wishes to follow the reasoning of an administrative agency. The
substantial evidence rule, where adopted, may at times be either
broadened or, on the other hand, reduced to mere lip service by
calling a legal problem a question of fact 9 7 or by saying that the
95. For a recent survey of New Jersey administrative law see Moran,
Administrative Law, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 40 (1954). And see Lakewood Express
Service, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Commissioners, infra note 96.
96. Lakewood Express Service, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Commissioners,
137 N.J.L. 440, 60 A.2d 298 (1948), reversed, 1 N.J. 45, 61 A.2d 730 (1948). The
Commission had found that seven-passenger sedans were not reasonably
safe for bus transportation, a finding, one might think that, if anybody, a
public utilities commission is competent to make. It was first unanimously
upheld, but a brand-new court held otherwise on rehearing. I think of no
example that would serve better to reduce to the absurd the doctrine of
judicial infallibility.
97. E.g., Brook's Inc. v. Claywell, 215 Ark. 913, 224 S.W.2d 37 (1949) (question whether corporation president was employed so as to establish the work-
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evidence was not substantial enough, and so forth. 8 The picture
is a many-colored one, more than a restatement of generalities can
reveal. Each state, as well as the Federal Government, has its own
law of judicial review that is not quite like that of any other. And
within each jurisdiction the law oscillates between principles. The
situation of admfnistrative law in this country is thus not unlike the
one of Continental private law at the time of Savigny, the founder of
the Historical School of Law. The time is not yet ripe for codification
or restatement.
men's compensation commission's jurisdiction is one of "fact" to be determined
by agency); State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board, 230 Ind.. 1,
101 N.E.2d 60 (1951), 101 U. OF PA. L. REV. 284 ("good cause" for leaving
employment so as to entitle to unemployment compensation not further
defined in statute, hence it arms the Board with too wide a discretion. The
last-mentioned decision patently overlooks that there is a body of case law
defining the phrase "good cause" common to all unemployment compensation
laws). And see Claims of Foscarinis, 132 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (reenactment doctrine upheld in unemployment compensation matter).
98. As in Leggerini v. Department of Unempl. Comp., supra note 62, despite
the fact that Washington professes to follow the substantial-evidence rule.
See Appeal of Farwest Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wash.2d 134, 114 P.2d 164 (1941).

